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Inferences and Modal Vocabulary
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Florian Richter
Abstract
Deduction is the one of the major forms of inferences and commonly
used in formal logic. This kind of inference has the feature of monotonic-
ity, which can be problematic. There are different types of inferences
that are not monotonic, e.g. abductive inferences. The debate between
advocates and critics of abduction as a useful instrument can be recon-
structed along the issue, how an abductive inference warrants to pick out
one hypothesis as the best one. But how can the goodness of an infer-
ence be assessed? Material inferences express good inferences based on
the principle of material incompatibility. Material inferences are based on
modal vocabulary, which enriches the logical expressivity of the inferential
relations. This leads also to certain limits in the application of labeling
in machine learning. I propose a modal interpretation of implications to
express conceptual relations.
1 Introduction1
1.1 Context – Commitments
To contextualize this paper, I will start with two commitments. (1.) I believe
that philosophy can contribute to the debates in the field of artificial intelligence.
The philosophy of language and the philosophy of logic provide us with many
tools and insights of language use and how we use concepts.
(2.) I believe that inferential relations govern our concept use. So, if we
label something, what we actually do, is drawing an inference.2 There are
different kinds of inferential classifications: to label something or to describe
something are actions that are governed by inferential relations.[3] It could also
be described as a difference between classificatory and conceptual inferences.[14]
1This paper is based on a talk that I gave at the International Conference on Information
and Computer Technologies (ICICT 2020) in San Jose.
2Charles Sanders Peirce thinks that a perceptual judgment is really an abductive inference,
that can be made explicit.[10] (CP 5.3) In epistemological debates in philosophy it is an
extensively discussed topic, whether to perceive something is to draw an inference or not.
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1.2 Problem
There are different kinds of inferences, like e.g. induction, deduction, and abduc-
tion. – Deduction is the one of the major forms of inferences and commonly used
in formal logic. This kind of inference has the feature of monotonicity, which
can be problematic as the famous example of the “flying penguin” shows.[6] Take
the premises: (1.) Tweety is a penguin. (2.) Penguins are birds. (3.) Birds can
fly. From these premises can be concluded, that Tweety can fly. If we add the
statement that penguins cannot fly, we can draw the consequence that Tweety
can´t fly, but the former statement that Tweety can fly is still valid. So, we have
an inconsistent knowledge base.[6] – And nothing is more awful for a logician, if
there is an inconsistency. It is possible to construct a consistent metalanguage
like a calculus for propositional logic with the introduction of deductive rea-
soning (modus ponens) and the feature of monotonicity, but the example above
shows the problematic point of using deductive reasoning for natural language
use and it is mainly connected with the feature of monotonicity, which therefore
has to be omitted.
2 Nonmonotic Inferences
There are different types of inferences that are not monotonic, e.g. abductive in-
ferences do not require an exhaustive list of conditions or premises that might be
in the end inconsistent, because it is more about proposing premises as hypothe-
ses. Charles Sanders Peirce writes: “Deduction proves that something must be;
Induction shows that something actually is operative; Abduction merely sug-
gests that something may be.” [10] (CP 5.171) The debate between advocates
and critics of abduction as a useful instrument can be reconstructed along the
issue, how an abductive inference warrants to pick out one hypothesis as the
best one (given that there is an already established set of hypotheses to choose
from).[5] There are approaches that claim that the best hypothesis is picked
out by applying principles like coherence or simplicity to the explanations.[15]
It needs to be shown, how these principles can be at least spelled out more
concretely.
2.1 Abduction - Peirce
Peirce worked extensively on this kind of inference, although he admitted in
several occasions that he confused induction and abduction. (He called abduc-
tion hypothetic inference, but understood later that it is actually an induction
from qualities and that abduction is something else.)3 Peirce describes the form
of the inference in the following way:
3“By hypothetic inference, I mean, [. . . ] an induction from qualities”[11] (CP 6.145) “Only
in almost everything I printed before the beginning of this century I more or less mixed up
Hypothesis and Induction...” [12] (CP 8.227)
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“Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was rec-
ognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory
hypothesis – which is just what abduction is – was subject to certain
conditions. Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a
hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it would account for the facts
or some of them. The form of inference, therefore, is this:
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
Thus, A cannot be abductively inferred, or if you prefer the expres-
sion, cannot be abductively conjectured until its entire content is
already present in the premiss, ‘If A were true, C would be a matter
of course.’”[10] (CP 5.188/189)
To admit or propose a hypothesis as a hypothesis is only possible with respect
to the fact. The inference presupposes the relation of them in the premise. It is
in fact not an act of cognition – of grasping the propositional content, that the
premise expresses –, but an act of recognition of the relation.
In the end, what is important is to know which conditions should be fulfilled
that the abductive inference is a good inference. According to him the “question
of the goodness of anything is whether that thing fulfills its end.” And the end
of the abductive inference is “to lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the
establishment of a habit of positive expectations that shall not be disappointed”.
One needs to be capable to experimentally verify the expectations of the hy-
pothesis. Peirce sees of course that this leads to the question: “What are we
to understand by experimental verification?” – But experimental verification
is governed by other principles, rules, and inferences and then we are talking
about the “logic of induction”.4
2.2 Abduction - Best Explanation
There are other suggestions for the goodness of an abductive inference (without
diving in the vast discourse in the philosophy of science). Paul Thagard claims
that a theory explains the facts better, if it does not make additional statements
that might not seem plausible or hard to combine with other explanations, facts,
4“Admitting, then, that the question of Pragmatism is the question of Abduction, let us
consider it under that form. What is good abduction? What should an explanatory hypothesis
be to be worthy to rank as a hypothesis? Of course, it must explain the facts. But what other
conditions ought it to fulfill to be good? The question of the goodness of anything is whether
that thing fulfills its end. What, then, is the end of an explanatory hypothesis? Its end is,
through subjection to the test of experiment, to lead to the avoidance of all surprise and
to the establishment of a habit of positive expectation that shall not be disappointed. Any
hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any special reasons to the contrary,
provided it be capable of experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such
verification. This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. But just here a broad question
opens out before us. What are we to understand by experimental verification? The answer
to that involves the whole logic of induction.”[10] (CP 5.197)
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or theories. He mentions the advantages of Charles Darwin´s theory of natural
selection to explain certain facts, like e.g. the geographic distribution of species.
Another example that the mentions is the “phlogiston theory” that “burning ob-
jects give off the substance phlogiston, whereas, according to Lavoisier, burning
objects combine with oxygen. The main point of Lavoisier´s argument is that
his theory can explain the fact that bodies undergoing combustion increase in
weight rather than decrease [...]. To explain the same fact, proponents of the
phlogiston theory had to make such odd assumptions as that the phlogiston
that was supposedly given off had ‘negative weight.’”[15] (77/78) Thagard sug-
gests therefore that the “above arguments exemplify three important criteria for
determining the best explanation.” These criteria are: “consilience, simplicity,
and analogy.” Important is here to mention that by “criteria” he does “not mean
necessary or sufficient conditions.”[15] (77/78)
It is also argued that the hypothesis needs to yield an explanation that is
sufficiently good enough[9], but it is not clear what “sufficiently good enough”
might mean and involve. Another example of nonmontonic inferences is clearer
in this respect: material inferences. They express good inferences based on the
principle of material incompatibility. The claim, if p then q, is incompatible with
the claim that it is possible that p and not-q.[2] Instead of formal inconsistencies
(like in the case of deduction) a kind of material incoherence can be expressed
and is taken as a principle to distinguish good inferences from bad inferences,
but the same problem arises, because if it is not possible to deal with inconsistent
predicates or propositions like in the example of the flying penguin, it would be
also difficult to deal with incoherent or incompatible ones.
2.3 Material Inferences
Brandom develops an incompatibility semantics in his book Between Saying and
Doing. Brandom uses the deontic vocabulary “commitment” and “entitlement”.
Being committed to a claim does not only mean to state that the claim is true,
but also to commit yourself to be able to justify the claim. It is your responsi-
bility to give a reason for your commitment and if you have a reason you might
be also entitled to the claim. If you are e.g. committed to a plane figure being
rectangular, you also have to be committed to its being polygonal. “And the old
nautical meteorological homily, ‘Red sky at night, sailor´s delight; red sky in
morning, sailor take warning,’ tells us that anyone who sees a colorful sunrise is
entitled to the claim that a storm that day is probable.” Brandom writes that
this “reasoning is only probative, not dispositive”, because the “colorful sunrise
provides some reason to predict a storm, but does not yet settle the matter.
Other considerations, such as a rising barometer, may license one not to draw
the conclusion one would otherwise be entitled to by the original evidence.”[2]
(119/120)
A deductive inferential relation means that if you are committed to one claim
you also have to be committed to the consequence of the claim. A rectangular
figure is also polygonal. Both predicates are not incompatible with each other.
An inductive inferential relation means that one who is entitled to one claim
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is also entitled to the the consequence of the claim. Important is here that
the “reasoning is only probative”. Brandom talks here about predictions. In
machine learning one of the interests lies in making predictions from experience
or data. If you commit yourself to the claim that “Pedro is a donkey”, then
you have to be committed to the claim that “Pedro is a mammal.” All that is
incompatible with the second claim is also incompatible with the first one.5
3 Incompatibility
The inferential relations of deduction and induction can be made explicit by
the deontic vocabulary of “commitment” and “entitlement”. For Brandom it
seems possible to make “incompatibility-entailments” explicit by a specific “kind
of inferences”: “modally qualified conditionals”. He writes that if “two properties
(such as being a mammal and being an invertebrate) are incompatible then it is
impossible for any object simultaneously to exhibit both.” This means therefore
“it is impossible for anything to be a donkey and not be a mammal. That is why
the incompatibility-entailment in question supports counterfactuals such as ‘If
my first pet (in fact, let us suppose, a fish) had been a donkey, it would have
been a mammal.’ We could say: ‘Necessarily, anything that is a donkey is a
mammal.’”[2] (121/122)
The modal vocabulary is a specific tool of expressing inferential relations.
Relations between species and genus can be made explicit by this “modally
qualified conditionals”. If a genus has necessarily a certain characteristic, also
the species has to have it. There are also certain characteristics that do not
necessarily belong to the genus, because not all the species have it. Every
mammal has necessarily a heart, but not every mammal has necessarily legs
(e.g. whales or dolphins). This is connected with the semantic dimension of the
concepts. The essential idea of Brandom is that incompatibility does not have
to be mistaken with inconsistency on the formal, logical side. It can be that
one claim is not incompatible with other claims individually, but it can be that
it is incompatible with a set of these individual claims, e.g. “the claim that the
piece of fruit in my hand is a blackberry is incompatible with the two claims
that it is red and that it is ripe, though not with either individually”.[2] (123)
It is an important question, how incompatibility can be formlized. Maybe
one can formalize it by introducing an operator for incompatibility, but then
it has to be shown, how the this operator is primitive or how it can be for-
mulated by definition with other primitive operators. Brandom writes that “p
is incompatible with the set consisting of p → q and ∼ q, but not with ei-
ther individually.”[2] (123) I believe that after the arrow should be the set and
that the implication does not belong to the set. The set can be expressed as a
conjunctions of claims:
(1) x is a blackberry is incompatible with x is red ∧ x is ripe
5“Thus ‘Pedro is a donkey,’ incompatibility-entails ‘Pedro is a mammal,’ for everything
incompatible with Pedro’s being a mammal (for instance, Pedro’s being an invertebrate, an
electronic apparatus, a prime number) is incompatible with Pedro’s being a donkey.” [2] (121)
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(2) y is a cherry is ¬incompatible with y is red ∧ y is ripe
Intuitively it could also be expressed in the following way:
(3) p ∧ q → ¬r If x is a red and a blackberry, then it is not ripe.
Problematic is that it would also be true in the case that the antecedent is false.
There are other sets of sentences that are incompatible and the problem is
here, that at the level of formal logic and universal statements, it leads to in-
consistencies, that can not be solved on the formal level. The general statement
that all birds fly has its problems with species that belong to the genus bird,
but do not fly, like e.g. penguins.
(4) x is a dove is ¬inccompatible with x is a bird ∧ x flies
(5) y is a penguin is incompatible with y is a bird ∧ y flies
The statement in (5) on the left side is not incompatible with all sentences,
but just with one. If the sets are interpreted in a probabilistic way then a
weight is assigned to them according to how many sentences are compatible or
incompatible. Of course, a lot of logical fine-tuning has to be done in order to
understand the nature of concepts. The expressive logical tools to do so need to
be examined and the analytic framework that contains them. The introduction
of modal vocabulary can help here.
4 Modal Vocabulary
Possible worlds are sometimes interpreted as existing parallel worlds (David
Lewis) or as worlds that are accesible from the actual world and they represent
different states of the actual world, which can be expressed by counterfactuals
(Saul Kripke).[8]6 Possible worlds are logically consistent within themselves and
to a certain degree the likelihood of the weights (predicates) can be adjusted.
But to start just with logical consistency, will never get you to what is actually
the case. All possible worlds seem to be equally likely. That is why I suggest
that the actual world should be represented by a proposition that serves as the
antecedent of a conditional. The antecedent identifies or picks out the object
that is classified in the consequent.
(6) p → q ∧ ¬r If x is a blackberry, then x is red and x is not ripe.
6There is a widely used example that shows how a counterfactual statement expresses the
unlikelihood of a possible world and this makes it at least seem difficult to take counterfactuals
as adequate expressive tools. There is a difference between: “If Shakespeare did not write
Hamlet, someone else did.” and “If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, someone else would
have.” The counterfactual expresses in way an idea that at least one person might have
written the same piece of art word by word. The example is from Jonathan Bennett.[1] For
an analysis of conditionals and the difference between indicative and subjunctive conditionals
see von Fintel (2012). The discussion of possible worlds revolves around the similarity of
the worlds and the possible worlds are placed in the antecedent.[16] This is different to the
approach that is proposed here.
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In the conditional the antecedent expresses a sufficient condition for the conse-
quent, while the consequent expresses a necessary condition. Another example
is: If Nellie is an elephant, she has a trunk. Being an elephant is a sufficient
condition of her to have a trunk and having a trunk is a necesarry condition
that she is an elephant.[4] But the consequent expresses possible or dispositional
properties.7
(7) p → ♦(q ∧ ¬r) If x is a blackberry, then it is possible that x is red and x is
not ripe.
The antecedent expresses here the starting point or the condition that forms
the possible world (consequent). It is a set of propositions or properties which
are possible, but also necessarily possible.8 It gives room for updating the
properties, i.e. to change the proposition, but also to regard them as necessary
properties of the object. The consequent expresses as a conjunction conceptual
relations between sets of propositions. I would call it the intensional part and the
possible world. Possible worlds express conceptual relations and not ontological
worlds or other realities. They are models of conceptual relations. Even if the
antecedent is not realized they are true, but without the antecedent the relation
has no context. It makes no sense to say that something is possibly red and not
ripe – but what exactly? – We are talking about blackberries and not about
cherries.
5 Limits of Labeling
The underlying conceptual problem is that concepts, at least non-analytic con-
cepts, have only necessary characteristics and not necessary and sufficient char-
acteristics. For analytic concepts it might be possible to have a list of necessary
features of the concept and together they are sufficient to grasp or describe the
concept. We do not have an exhaustive list of features that constitute a con-
cept. To every characteristic another can be added: e.g. that elephants have
trunks, have four legs, are grey. Every feature is necessary, but not sufficient to
describe the species elephant. What can be selected are only necessary features,
when we label or cluster. Therefore, conceptually there is already a limitation
involved. – I believe that this limitation lies in the underlying logical structure
of concept use in classifying or labeling objects. (In the end, the properties are
only possible properties, but necessarily possible.)
This ideas can be linked to labeling in machine learning. A learning algo-
rithm can be supervised or unsupervised. Supervised learning means that the
data engineer knows what is “correct” or “incorrect”, it is labeled like this. In
7Thomas Zoglauer writes that they express natural laws, but that is not correct. Disposi-
tional properties are not natural laws. They have a different logical form.[17] (41)
8One axiom of the modal system S5 is that something that is possible is necessarily possible
(♦p → ♦p). The necessary conditionality is expressed by the role the antecedent and the
consequent play in the truth values of the conditional. Maybe the axiom of S5 stems actually
from the logical structure of the implication.
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unsupervised learning clusters are build by examples. John Guttag, in his book
Introduction to Computation and Programming Using Python, uses as an ex-
ample how to classify animals as reptiles. Of course, we already know which
animal is a reptile and which is not. We use some examples to extract features
that, we suppose, are necessary conditions, like: is cold-blooded, has scales, lays
eggs, is poisonous, has no legs. These features are extracted from the examples:
cobra and rattlesnake. If we add boa constrictor (to the training data), then we
see that laying eggs and poisonous are not necessary features. Unfortunately,
a salmon would now also be classified as a reptile and an alligator would not
count as an reptile. So, the feature has no legs has to be discarded as irrelevant,
too. (Or, that a reptile has either no legs or four legs.)[7] (375-377) It depends
here not only on the fact that we know which animal is a reptile, but also on
what is a necessary condition for being a reptile.
“Does this mean that we should give up because all of the available
features are mere noise? No. In this case, the features scales and
cold-blooded are necessary conditions for being a reptile, but not
sufficient conditions. The rule that an animal is a reptile if it has
scales and is cold-blooded will not yield any false negatives, i.e., any
animal classified as non-reptile will indeed not be a reptile. However,
it will yield some false positives, i.e., some of the animals classified
as reptiles will not be reptiles.”[7] (377)
I think that he is correct that they are only necessary conditions, but the neces-
sity is based on a stipulation by us. – Observable and perceivable properties, like
to have scales, are only conditional generalities that are embedded in a context
or situation or bound to a singular thing. They are empirically verified.9 The
stipulations are nor arbitrary, because the are undergirded empirically. One
can now count on them and calculate with them. The classification encodes
knowledge that can be used to “calculate” with it.
6 Concept Use
The consequent of the conditional can then be used as the antecedent or premise
for another conditional.
(8) ♦ (q ∧ ¬r) → ♦s
If it is red and not ripe, then it is not eatable. – The formalization of a dispo-
sitional predicate is much more difficult. Some use conditionals and others use
counterfactuals, but this would lead us to another topic. Brandom writes that
in
“the most general sense, one classifies something simply by respond-
ing to it differentially. Stimuli are grouped into kinds by the response-
kinds they tend to elicit. In this sense, a chunk of iron classifies its
9This is the idea of abduction from Peirce. We stipulate a hypothesis and see if it applies
to a case, but it has to be undergirded empirically.
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environments into kinds by rusting in some of them and not others,
increasing or decreasing its temperature, shattering or remaining in-
tact. As is evident from this example, if classifying is just exercising
a reliable differential responsive disposition, it is a ubiquitous feature
of the inanimate world.”[3] (200/201)
An algorithm would be a “good” algorithm, if it classifies the objects reliably.
Problematic is for Brandom that “[c]lassification as the exercise of reliable dif-
ferential responsive dispositions (however acquired) is not by itself yet a good
candidate for conceptual classification, in the basic sense in which applying a
concept to something is describing it.”[3] (202) He builds his epistemological ap-
proach on Sellars, who states that in order to describe objects we need to “locate
these objects in a space of implications” and therefore we do not “merely label”
them10, or merely classify them. It means not just to know in which situation
to respond reliably, but also to know the consequences of the application11 and
to understand, when propositions or sets of propositions are used as antecedents
or consequents in conditionals or implications. Canonized knowledge, which is
based on empirical knowledge, can serve as a premise of a conditional. It is a
necessary and general knowledge (a posteriori) – a possibility in the “space of
implications” that can be used to “calculate” with it or to count on it. This
means that it is reliable knowledge.
Space of implications: The classification is: p → ♦(q ∧ ¬r) (If x is a black-
berry, then it is possible that x is red and x is not ripe.) and the description
is: ♦ (q ∧ ¬r) → ♦s (If it is red and not ripe, then it is not eatable.) One
has to understand which role the (sets of) propositions play (being premises or
consequences) in order to “move” competently in the web of inferences. That
means also that there are different kinds of concept use that only make sense
and have meaning within the “space of implications”.
The space of implications is a space of conceptual possibilities and has to
be elaborated. Which kind of reasons are good reasons in the sense that they
are employed in the right language game. The adequacy of concept use and
its location in the right language game are crucial to distinguish between dif-
ferent kinds of reasons. This means that statements are embedded in a logical
space of conditions. There are different kinds of conditions for statements: they
can represent reasons, conceptual relations, causes, or also motivational states
that explain actions. Inferring from the statements to its conditions is part of
abductive reasoning.
10“It is only because the expressions in terms of which we describe objects, even such basic
expressions as words for the perceptible characteristics of molar objects, locate these objects
in a space of implications, that they describe at all, rather than merely label.” [13] (section
108)
11“To learn what they mean is to learn, for instance, that the owner put a red label on
boxes to be discarded, green on those to be retained, and yellow on those that needed further
sorting and decision. Once I know what follows from affixing one rather than another label,
I can understand them not as mere labels, but as descriptions of the boxes to which they are
applied. Description is classification with consequences, either immediately practical (‘to be
discarded/examined/kept’) or for further classifications.”[3] (203)
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